United States Court of Appeals For the Ninth Circuit

No. 3514

United States
Circuit Court of Appeals

For the Ninth Cirruit.

GEORGE E. KNOWLTON and JERRY KNOWL-

TON,
Plaintiffs in Error,
vs.

THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Defendant in Error.

eee ee

Cranscript of Record.

Upon Writ of Error to the United States District Court for the
District of Oregon.

No. 3514

Runited States

Girrnit Court of Appeals

Bor the Ninth Cirriit.

GEORGE E. KNOWLTON and JERRY KNOWL-

TON,
Plaintiffs in Error,
VS.

THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Defendant in Error.

Cransrript of Record.

Upon Writ of Error to the United States District Court for the
District of Oregon.

INDEX.

Page
FSS 100002 | ce 17
eewommientiOl HAKOPS.....22....5.-c.ecceseceuscecesseesesceeenee 26
pilot EME CTINOMG) 2.0.2.2. eas cecceleevsass coe loecacese eco 43
Bond of George E. Knowlton.......0.0200000000000000..2... 36
Bondi Jerre Knowaton ..............-....-.:0--cs0ceeceso-e-0- 40
Citawioncon Writ OL MUGROR. 22. ec20i..ccieeccectevcsceeeeee 6
Pitaapmemme nine Oi SUEY... ......2cc2-2cetsanesc-sseveceeece-eacecasee ibe,
ITE Soc 10, ee ee 9
ASIC LC OC) 1S) nn eee ean 61

Names and Addresses of Attorneys of Record.... 5

eC ged is 0 | 2) rn 35
Order Enlarging Time to File Transcript............ 78
Reviiiow for Vyrit Of HTOr.............2.............20-c000- 24
Se, Ee Ate hol oe 17 18
BANA TA We Oe ee ION Yt cP 22
Seipmlation as to Reeord..................:..-0----s.-2--- see 76
Drea se asec eS cate ccten ea eee 20

RP MITGIMESIPROU <..chcecci..-c02ecdeneccccecchesseesdeasoetossceseestecee 7

United States of America 5

Names and Addresses of Attorneys of Record.

MESSRS. MANNING & BECKMAN,
Fenton Building, Portland, Oregon.
For the Plaintiffs in Error.

MR. LESTER W. HUMPHREYS,
United States Attorney.

MR. HALL §S. LUSK,
Assistant United States Attorney, Portland,
Oregon.

For the Defendant in Error.

6 George E. Knowlton, et al, vs.

In the District Court of the United States for the
District of Oregon.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff,
Vs.
GEORGE E. KNOWLTON and
JERRY KNOWLTON,
Defendants.

Citation on Writ of Error.

United States of America,
District of Oregon,—-ss.

To the United States of America, and to Lester W.
Humphreys, United States Attorney for the Dis-
trict of Oregon, GREETING:

You are hereby cited and admonished to be and
appear before the United States Circuit Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, at San Francisco,
California, within thirty days from the date here-
of, pursuant to a writ of error filed in the Clerk’s
office of the District Court of the United States
for the District of Oregon, wherein George E.
Knowlton and Jerry Knowlton are plaintiffs in er-
ror and you are defendant in error, to show cause,
if any there be, why the judgment in the said writ
of error mentioned should not be corrected and
speedy justice should not be done to the parties in
that behalf.

Given under my hand, at Portland, in said Dis-

United States of America 7

trict, this 19th day of April, in the year of our Lord
one thousand nine hundred and twenty.
R. S. BEAN, Judge.

Due service of the within citation accepted this
19th day of April, 1920.
HALL 8. LUSK,
Asst. U. 8. Attorney.
[Endorsed]: United States District Court, Dis-
trict of Oregon. Filed April 19, 1920, G. H. Marsh,
Clerk.

In the United States Circuit Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Clreuit.

Writ of Error.

GEORGE E. KNOWLTON and
JERRY KNOWLTON,
Plaintiffs in Error,
vs.
THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Defendant in Error.

The United States of America,—SS.

The President of the United States of America, to
the Judges of the District Court of the United
States for the District of Oregon, GREETING:
Because in the records and proceedings, as also

in the rendition of the Judgment of a plea which

is in the District Court before the Honorable ROB-

ERT S. BEAN, one of you, between the United

States of America, plaintiff and defendant in er-

8 George E. Knowlton, et al, vs.

ror, and George E. Knowlton and Jerry Knowlton,
defendants and plaintiffs in error, a manifest er-
ror hath happened to the great damage of the said
plaintiffs in error, as by complaint doth appear;
and we, being willing that error, if any hath been,
should be duly corrected, and full and speedy jus-
tice done to the parties aforesaid, and, in this be-
half, do command you, if judgment be therein
given, that then, under your seal, distinctly and
openly, you send the record and proceedings afore-
said, with all things concerning the same, to the
United States Circuit Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit, together with this writ, so that you
have the same at San Francisco, California, within
thirty days from the date hereof, in the said Circuit
Court of Appeals to be then and there held; that
the record and proceedings aforesaid, being then
and there inspected, the said Circuit Court of Ap-
peals may cause further to be done therein to cor-
rect that error, what of right and according to the
laws and customs of the United States of America
should be done.

WITNESS the Honorable EDWARD DOUG-
LAS WHITE, Chief Justice of the Supreme Court
of the United States, this 19th day of April, 1920.

[Seal] G. H. MARSH,
Clerk of the District Court of the United States for

the District of Oregon.

I hereby certify that the foregoing writ of error

United States of America 9

was duly served upon the District Court of the
United States for the district of Oregon by filing
with me, as the Clerk of said Court, a duly certi-
fied copy thereof on this 19th day of April, 1920.
G. H. MARSH,
Clerk of the District Court of the United States
for the District of Oregon.

[Endorsed]: Filed April 19, 1920. GH Marsh,
Clerk United States District Court, District of Ore-
gon.

BE IT REMEMBERED, that on the 28th day
of June, 1919, there was filed in the United States
District Court for the District of Oregon an Indict-
ment, in words and figures as follows, to-wit:

In the District Court of the United States for the
District of Oregon.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Vs.

GEORGE E. KNOWLTON, alias George
W. Wilson,

FLORENCE MAY KNOWLTON, alias
Florence Wilson,

JERRY KNOWLTON, alias Jerry Smith,
alias James King,

Defendants.

Indictment for Violation of Section 37 of the Fed-
eral Penal Code and Section 5 of the Act of

10 George E. Knowlton, et al, vs.

Congress approved March 3, 1917, known as the
“REED AMENDMENT?” (37 Stat. 1069).
United States of America,
District of Oregon,—ss.

The Grand Jurors of the United States of Amer-
ica for the District of Oregon, duly impaneled,
sworn and charged to inquire within and for said
district, upon their oaths and affirmations, do find,
charge, allege and present:

COUNT ONE:

That GEORGE E. KNOWLTON, alias George
W. Wilson; FLORENCE MAY KNOWLTON, alias
Florence Wilson; JERRY KNOWLTON, alias
Jerry Smith, alias James King, the defendants
above named, on, to-wit: the first day of January,
1919, the exact time and place thereof being to the
Grand Jurors unknown, did then and there know-
ingly, wilfully and feloniously conspire, combine,
confederate and agree together with, between and
among themselves and with divers other persons to
this Grand Jury unknown, to commit the acts made
offenses and crimes by the laws of the United
States, to-wit: Section Five of the Act of Congress
approved March 3, 1917, known as the Reed Amend-
ment, that is to say: That the said above named de-
fendants did then and there knowingly, unlawfully,
wilfully and feloniously conspire, combine, confed-
erate and agree together with, between and among
themselves and with divers other persons to this

United States of America 11

Grand Jury unknown, to enter into, devise and exe-
cute and did devise and execute a plot and scheme
to order, purchase and cause intoxicating liquors
for beverage purposes to be transported in inter-
state commerce, to-wit: from the State of Cali-
fornia to the State and District of Oregon and to
and into a State, the laws whereof then and there
prohibited the manufacture and sale therein of in-
toxicating liquors for beverage purposes and which
intoxicating liquors so as aforesaid to be ordered,
purchased and caused to be transported as afore-
said, were not to be and were not so ordered, pur-
chased and caused to be transported in interstate
commerce as aforesaid for scientific, sacramental,
medicinal and mechanical purposes, or for any pur-
pose other than for beverage purposes in violation
of the said Act of Congress as aforesaid.

That it was a part and portion of said unlawful,
wilful and felonious conspiracy, so entered into as
aforesaid by the above named defendants, that said
plot and scheme to violate said Reed Amendment
as aforesaid was to be carried out, carried on and
effected by the following means, methods and
plans, that is to say: That at certain cities, towns
and places in the State of California, the exact
cities, towns and places therein being to this Grand
Jury unknown, the said defendants were to order
and purchase intoxicating liquor for beverage pur-
poses from persons whose names are to this Grand
Jury unknown. That such intoxicating liquor, so

12 George E. Knowlton, et al, vs.

ordered and purchased as aforesaid, was thereupon
and thereat to be placed in and about certain auto-
mobiles and in and about certain receptacles there-
in specially provided therefor, and that said auto-
mobiles containing said intoxicating liquor as afore-
said, were to be hauled and driven by said defend-
ants to and into certain cities, towns and places in
the State and District of Oregon, the exact cities,
towns and places therein being to this Grand Jury
unknown. That upon the arrival of said automo-
biles containing said intoxicating liquor as afore-
said and so hauled and driven to and into the State
of Oregon as aforesaid, the said defendants were
to receive, conceal and store the said intoxicating
liquor, which said intoxicating liquor was to be
thereafter sold and distributed in various cities in
said State of Oregon, the exact places of sale and
distribution thereof being to this Grand Jury un-
known; that the said wilful, unlawful and felonious
conspiracy, so entered into by the above named de-
fendants as aforesaid, continued from the date of
the conspiracy as aforesaid up to and including the
15th day of June, 1919. That at and during all the
times between said dates as aforesaid, said unlaw-
ful, wilful and felonious conspiracy was continually
in existence and in operation and that at and during
all of said times, all of the above named defendants
as aforesaid, continued to wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously conspire, combine, confederate and
agree together to commit the said crime herein set

forth.

United States of America 13

And the Grand Jurors aforesaid, upon their
oaths and affirmations aforesaid, do further find,
charge, allege and present:

1. That in pursuance and in furtherance of
said unlawful, wilful and felonious conspiracy, com-
bination, confederation and agreement and to ef-
fect the object thereof, the said defendants on, to-
wit: the 6th day of June, 1919, at Portland, in the
State and District of Oregon, caused certain auto-
mobiles to be taken and driven from said City of
Portland, in the State of Oregon, to a certain point
in the State of California, the exact place thereof
being to the Grand Jurors unknown, which said
automobiles, so taken and driven as aforesaid, were
to be used by said defendants in conveying intoxi-
cating liquors for beverage purposes, which said in-
toxicating liquors as aforesaid, were to be ordered
and purchased in the State of California and which
said automobiles, so to be used as aforesaid, were
to be thereafter driven from the State of Cali-
fornia to the State of Oregon.

2. That in furtherance and in pursuance of the
said unlawful and felonious conspiracy, combina-
tion, confederation and agreement and to effect the
object thereof, said defendant George E. Knowlton,
alias as aforesaid, and Florence May Knowlton,
alias as aforesaid, on to-wit: the 10th day of June,
drove a certain automobile, to-wit: a Stutz automo-
bile bearing an Oregon license number, to-wit: 39,-

14 George E. Knowlton, et al, vs.

447, which said automobile then and there con-
tained a quantity of intoxicating liquor for bever-
age purposes, to-wit: 234 quarts of whiskey, which
said automobile containing said intoxicating liquor
as aforesaid was by said above named defendants,
driven from a point in California, the exact place
thereof being to the Grand Jurors unknown, to
Lakeview in the State and District of Oregon.

3. That in furtherance and in pursuance of the
said unlawful and felonious conspiracy, combina-
tion, confederation and agreement and to effect
the object thereof, said defendant Jerry Knowlton,
alias as aforesaid, on to-wit: the 10th day of June,
drove a certain automobile, to-wit: a Mercer auto-
mobile bearing a California license number, to-wit:
308789, which said automobile then and there con-
tained a quantity of intoxicating liquor for bever-
age purposes, to-wit: 201 quarts of whiskey, which
said automobile containing said intoxicating liquor
as aforesaid was by the said above named defend-
ant, driven from a point in California, the exact
place thereof being to the Grand Jurors unknown,
to Lakeview in the State and District of Oregon.

4, That in furtherance and in pursuance of the
said unlawful and felonious conspiracy, combina-
tion, confederation and agreement and to effect the
object thereof, the said defendants George HE.
Knowlton, alias as aforesaid, Florence May Knowl-
ton, alias as aforesaid, and Jerry Knowlton, alias
as aforesaid, on to-wit: the 10th day of June, 1919,

United States of America 15

at a point about twenty-five miles from Lakeview,
in the State and District of Oregon, had in their
possession a quantity of intoxicating liquor for
beverage purposes, to-wit: 485 quarts of whiskey,
which said intoxicating liquor was packed in and
about two certain automobiles then and there be-
ing driven by and in the custody and under the
control of the said defendants, and which said in-
toxicating liquor so packed and contained in said
automobiles as aforesaid, had theretofore and on
said 10th day of June, 1919, been transported in
interstate commerce, to-wit: from the State of Cal-
ifornia to the State of Oregon aforesaid.

All of which is contrary to the form of the stat-
ute in such case made and provided and against
the peace and dignity of the United States of
America.

And the Grand Jurors aforesaid, upon their
oaths and affirmations aforesaid, do further find,
charge, allege and present:

COUNT TWO:

That GEORGE E. KNOWLTON, alias George
W. Wilson; FLORENCE MAY KNOWLTON, alias
Florence Wilson; JERRY KNOWLTON, alias
Jerry Smith, alias James King, the defendants
above named, on to-wit: the 10th day of June, 1919,
did knowingly, wilfully and unlawfully, order, pur-
chase and cause to be transported in interstate com-

16 George E. Knowlton, et al, vs.

merce, to-wit: from the State of California to Port-
land, in the State and District of Oregon and with-
in the jurisdiction of this Court, a quantity of in-
toxicating liquor for beverage purposes, to-wit: 485
quarts of whiskey, which said intoxicating liquor as
aforesaid, so caused to be transported in interstate
commerce as aforesaid, was transported to and into
a state, to-wit: Oregon, the laws whereof then and
there prohibited the manufacture and sale therein
of intoxicating liquor for beverage purposes, and
which intoxicating liquor so as aforesaid, ordered,
purchased and caused to be transported in inter-
state commerce as aforesaid, was not ordered, pur-
chased and caused to be transported in interstate
commerce as aforesaid for scientific, sacramental,
medicinal and mechanical purposes, or for any pur-
pose other than for beverage purposes, contrary to
the form of the statute in such cases made and pro-
vided and against the peace and dignity of the
United States of America.

Dated at Portland, Oregon, this 28th day of
June, 1919.

A TRUE BILL.

WALTER GADSBY,
Foreman, United States Grand Jury.
BARNETT H. GOLDSTEIN,
Assistant United States Attorney.

[Endorsed]: Filed June 28, 1919, in open court,
G. H. Marsh, Clerk.

United States of America 17

Record of Arraignment.

AND AFTERWARDS, to-wit: on Saturday, the
19th day of July, 1920, the same being the
JUDICIAL day of the Regular July term of said
Court; present the Honorable ROBERT S. BEAN,
United States District Judge, presiding, the follow-
ing proceedings were had in said cause, to-wit:

In the District Court of the United States for the
District of Oregon.

The United States of America,
VS.

George E. Knowlton, alias George W.
Wilson, Florence May Knowlton, alias
Florence Wilson, and Jerry Knowlton,
alias Jerry Smith, alias James King.

Now at this day come the plaintiff by Mr. Bar-
nett H. Goldstein, Assistant United States Attorney,
and the defendants, eGorge E. Knowlton, Florence
May Knowlton and Jerry Knowlton, each in his own
proper person and by Mr. John J. Beckman, of coun-
sel. Whereupon said defendants being duly ar-
raigned upon the indictment herein state to the
Court that their true names are George E. Knowl-
ton, Florence May Knowlton and Jerry Knowlton.

Record of Plea.

AND AFTERWARDS, to-wit: on Monday, the
11th day of August, 1919, the same being the 31st

18 George E. Knowlton, et al, vs.

JUDICIAL day of the Regular July Term of said
Court; present the Honorable ROBERT S. BEAN,
United States District Judge, presiding, the follow-
ing proceedings were had in said cause, to-wit:

In the District Court of the United States for the
District of Oregon.

The United States of America,
VS.
George E. Knowlton, et al.

Now, at this day, come the plaintiff by Mr.
Charles W. Reames, Assistant United States At-
torney, and the defendant Jerry Knowlton, in his
own proper person and by Mr. John J. Beckman, of
counsel, whereupon said defendant being duly ar-
raigned upon the indictment herein, for plea there-
to says he is not guilty.

Record of Plea.

AND AFTERWARDS, to-wit: on Tuesday, the
19th day of August, 1919, the same being the 38th
JUDICIAL day of the Regular July Term of said
Court; present the Honorable ROBERT 8S. BEAN,
United States District Judge, presiding, the follow-
ing proceedings were had in said cause, to-wit:

United States of America 19

In the District Court of the United States for the
District of Oregon.
The United States of America,
VS.
George E. Knowlton, Florence May
Knowlton, et al.

Now, at this day, come the plaintiff by Mr. Bert
E. Haney, United States Attorney, and the defend-
ants George E. Knowlton and Florence May Knowl-
ton, each in his and her own proper person, and by
Mr. John J. Beckman, of counsel, whereupon said
defendants for plea to the indictment herein each
say that they are not guilty.

Record of Empanelling Jury.

AND AFTERWARDS, to-wit: on Tuesday, the
20th day of November, 1919, the same being the
20th JUDICIAL day of the Regular November
Term of said Court; present the Honorable ROB-
ERT S. BEAN, United States District Judge, pre-
siding, the following proceedings were had in said
cause, to-wit:

In the District Court of the Umited States for the
District of Oregon.

The United States of America,
VS.

George Knowlton, alias Geo. W. Wilson,
Florence May Knowlton, alias Flor-
ence Wilson, Jerry Knowlton, alias
Jerry Smith, alias James King.

Now at this day come the plaintiff by Mr. Bar-

20 George E. Knowlton, et al, vs.

nett H. Goldstein, United States Attorney, and Mr.
John C. Veatch, Assistant United States Attorney,
and the defendants above named each in his own
proper person and by Mr. John J. Beckman and
Mr. John Manning, of counsel. Whereupon this be-
ing the day set for the trial of this cause now come
the following named jurors to try the issues joined,
viz.: C. Lewis Mead, Frederick E. Vrooman, X. M.
Morgan, Alton W. James, Austin D. Parker, A. W.
Bunn, Harry C. Moore, James W. Mason, C. M.
Stites, Richard E. Ward, M. Z. Donnell and J. D.
Smith, Sr.; twelve good and lawful men of the dis-
trict who, being accepted by both parties and being
duly impaneled and sworn, proceed to hear the evi-

dence adduced.

Record of Verdict.

AND AFTERWARDS, to-wit: on Wednesday,
the 26th day of November, 1919, the same being the
21st JUDICIAL day of the Regular November
Term of said Court; present the Honorable ROB-
ERT S. BEAN, United States District Judge, pre-
siding, the following proceedings were had in said
cause, to-wit:

United States of America 21

In the District Court of the United States for the
District of Oregon.

The United States of America
VS.

Geo. E. Knowlton, alias Geo. W. Wilson,
Florence May Knowlton, alias Florence
Wilson, Jerry Knowlton, alias Jerry
Smith, alias James King.

And thereafter, said plaintiff being present by
Mr. Barnett H. Goldstein, United States Attorney,
and Mr. John C. Veatch, Assistant United States
Attorney, and said defendants being present each
in his own proper person and by Mr. John J. Beck-
man and Mr. John Manning, of counsel, said jury
returns to the Court the following verdict, viz.:

“We, the Jury duly impaneled to try the above
entitled cause, do find the defendant George E.
Knowlton, alias George W. Wilson, disagree as
charged in Count One of the Indictment, and guilty
as charged in Count Two of the Indictment; and
we find the defendant Florence May Knowlton,
alias Florence Wilson, disagree as charged in Count
One of the Indictment, and guilty as charged in
Count Two of the Indictment, and we do further
find the defendant Jerry Knowlton, alias Jerry
Smith, alias James King, disagree as charged in
Count One of the Indictment, and guilty as charged
in Count Two of the Indictment herein.

22 George E. Knowlton, et al, vs.

Dated at Portland, Oregon, this 26th day of No-
vember, 1919.

AUSTIN D. PARKER, Foreman.”
which verdict is received by the Court and ordered
to be filed.

Record of Sentence.

AND AFTERWARDS, to-wit: on Wednesday,
the 10th day of December, 1919, the same being the
32nd JUDICIAL day of the Regular November
Term of said Court; present the Honorable ROB-
ERT 8. BEAN, United States District Judge, pre-
siding, the following proceedings were had in said
cause, to-wit:

In the District Court of the United States for the
District of Oregon.

The United States of America
vs.
George E. Knowlton, Florence May
Knowlton, and Jerry Knowlton.

Now at this day come the plaintiff by Mr. Bar-
nett H. Goldstein, Assistant United States Attor-
ney, and the defendants each in his own proper per-
son and by Mr. John Manning and Mr. J. J. Beck-
man, of counsel. Whereupon this cause comes on
to be heard upon the motions of said defendants
in arrest of judgment and for a new trial herein.
And the Court, having heard the arguments of
counsel, and being fully advised in the premises,

United States of America 23

IT IS ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that the
motion of Florence May Knowlton for a new trial
herein be and the same is hereby allowed, and that
the verdict of the jury heretofore filed herein be
and the same is hereby set aside as to her. And

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED AND AD-
JUDGED that the motions of George E. Knowlton
and Jerry Knowlton in arrest of judgment and for
a new trial herein be and the same are hereby de-
nied. Whereupon on motion of said plaintiff for
judgment against the said defendants George E.
Knowlton and Jerry Knowlton upon the verdict of
the Jury heretofore filed herein.

IT IS ADJUDGED that said George E. Knowl-
ton and Jerry Knowlton each be imprisoned in the
county jail of Multnomah County, Oregon, for the
term of six months, and that each of them stand
committed until this sentence be performed or un-
til he be discharged according to law.

In the District Court of the United States for the
District of Oregon.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff,
VS.
GEORGE E. KNOWLTON and JERRY
KNOWLTON,
Defendants.

Petition for Writ of Error.
To the Honorable CHARLES E. WOLVERTON

24 George E. Knowlton, et al, vs.

and ROBERT S. BEAN, Judges of the above en-
titled Court:

And now comes George E. Knowlton and Jerry
Knowlton, the defendants herein, and by their at-
torneys, Manning & Beckman, respectfully show
that on the 26th day of November, 1919, a jury duly
empaneled herein found your petitioners guilty of
the violation of the Act of Congress approved
March 8rd, 1917 (87 Stat. L. 1069), known as the
Reed Amendment, upon which said verdict sen-
tence was passed and final judgment entered
against your petitioners on the 10th day of Decem-
ber, 1919.

Your petitioners feeling themselves aggrieved
by said verdict and judgment in which judgment
and proceedings had prior thereto, certain errors
were committed to the prejudice of these defend-
ants, all of which will more fully appear from the
bill of exceptions and the assignment of errors filed
with this petition, do herewith petition the Honor-
able Court for an order allowing them to prosecute
a writ of errors to the United States Circuit Court
of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit under the rules
and laws of the United States in such case made
and provided.

WHEREFORE, these defendants pray that a
Writ of Error may issue in this behalf out of the
United States Circuit Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit for the correction of the errors so

United States of America 25

complained of and that an order be made approv-
ing the bond of your petitioners and staying all fur-
ther proceedings until determination of such Writ
of Error by said Circuit Court of Appeals, and that
a transcript of the records, proceedings and papers
in this cause, duly authenticated, may be sent to
the United States Circuit Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit.
GEORGE E. KNOWLTON,
JERRY KNOWLTON,
Defendants.
MANNING & BECKMAN,
Attorneys for Defendants.

State of Oregon,
County of Multnomah,—ss.

Due and legal service of the foregoing petition
is hereby accepted at the City of Portland, this 19th
day of March, 1920.

HALL S. LUSK,
Asst. United States Attorney.

[Endorsed]: United States District Court, Dis-
trict of Oregon. Filed April 19, 1920. G. H. Marsh,

Clerk.

26 George E. Knowlton, et al, vs.

In the District Court of the United States for the
District of Oregon.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff,
VS.
GEORGE E. KNOWLTON and JERRY
KNOWLTON, |
Defendants.

Assignment of Errors.

George E. Knowlton and Jerry Knowlton, the
defendants in the above entitled action and plain-
tiffs in error herein, having petitioned for an order
from said Court permitting them, and each of them,
to procure a Writ of Error to this Court directed
from the United States Circuit Court of Appeals
for the Ninth Circuit from the judgment and sen-
tence made and entered in said cause against the
said plaintiffs in error, and each of them, and pe-
titioners herein now make and file with the said
petition the following assignment of errors herein
upon which they, and each of them, will rely for a
reversal of the said judgment and sentence upon
the said writ, and which said errors, and each and
every of them, are to the great detriment, injury
and prejudice of the said plaintiffs in error, and
each of them, and in violation of the rights con-
fererd upon them, and each of them, by law; and
plaintiffs in error say that in the record and pro-
ceedings of the above entitled cause upon the hear-
ing and determination thereof in the District Court

United States of America 27

of the United States for the District of Oregon
there are manifest errors in this, to-wit:

lh.

That the Court erred in over-ruling the follow-

ing motion made by the defendant, George E.
Knowlton, at the close of the Government’s case:

“I also move the Court to instruct the jury
to bring in a verdict of acquittal as to Count 2,
the violation of the Reed Amendment. First,
for the reason that there has been no proof that
these defendants, or any of them, ordered, pur-
chased, or caused to be transported in interstate
commerce any intoxicating liquor from Cali-
fornia into Oregon; nor has there been any proof
of the purpose for which the intoxicating liquors
were to be used; and I might also say there is a
variance between the indictment and the proof.
The indictment says they ordered, purchased
and caused to be transported in interstate com-
merce from the State of California to Portland,
in the State and District of Oregon. The Grand
Jury having alleged definitely that they were
transporting this to Portland, I think they are
confined to that allegation. There has been no
proof whatsoever that these liquors, if there
were any at all, were to be transported to Port-
land, or anywhere near Portland, or that these
people had ever been in Portland.”

28 George E. Knowlton, et al, vs.

To which ruling of the Court the defendant duly
excepted.

ine

That the Court erred in over-ruling the motion
for a directed verdict made by the defendant, Jerry
Knowlton, which said motion is the same motion as
fully recited in assignment of errors number I. To
which ruling of the Court the said defendant duly
excepted.

Il.

That the Court erred in over-ruling the motion
of the defendant, George E. Knowlton, for a di-
rected verdict, made at the close of all the testimony
in the case, which said motion is the same as the
motion fully recited in assignment of errors num-
ber I. To which ruling of the Court the said de-

fendant duly excepted.
IV.

That the Court erred in over-ruling the motion
of the defendant, Jerry Knowlton, for a directed
verdict, made at the close of all the testimony in
the case, which said motion is the same as the mo-
tion fully recited in assignment of errors number I.
To which ruling of the Court the said defendant
duly excepted.

V.

That the Court erred in refusing the requests

United States of America 29

of the defendants, George E. Knowlton and Jerry

Knowlton, and each of them, to instruct the jury as
follows:

“Circumstantial evidence is the evidence of
certain facts from which are to be inferred the
existence of other material facts bearing upon
the question at issue or fact to be proved. This
evidence is legal and competent, and, when of
such a character as to exclude every reasonable
doubt of defendants’ innocence, is entitled to as
much weight as direct evidence. When a con-
viction is sought on circumstantial evidence
alone, it must not only be shown by preponder-
ance of evidence that the facts are true, but they
must be such as are absolutely opposed, upon
any reasonable ground of reasoning with the in-
nocence of the accused, and incapable of expla-
nation upon any reasonable hypothesis other
than that of the guilt of the accused. The de-
gree of certainty must be equal to that of direct
testimony and, if there is any single fact proved
to your satisfaction by a preponderance of evi-
dence which is inconsistent with defendants’
guilt, this is sufficient to raise a reasonable
doubt, and the jury should acquit the defendant.
In order to justify the inference of legal guilt
from circumstantial evidence, the proof must
be absolutely incompatible with the innocence of
the accused, and incapable of explanation upon
any other reasonable hypothesis than that of his

30

George E. Knowlton, et al, vs.

guilt. If there is any reasonable doubt as to —
reality of the connection of the circumstances
of evidence with the facts to be proved, or as to
the completeness of the proof, or as to the
proper conclusion to be drawn from the evi-
evidence, it is safer to err in acquitting than in
convicting.”

To which refusal of the Court to so instruct the

jury, the said defendants, and each of them, duly
excepted.

VI.

The Court erred in over-ruling the motion of the

defendants, George E. Knowlton and Jerry Knowl-
ton, and each of them, for a new trial, which mo-
tion was as follows:

“Comes now George E. Knowlton and Jerry
Knowlton, the above named defendant, each for
themselves, by their attorneys, Manning & Beck-
man, within the time allowed by Court, and
move the Court for a new trial on behalf of each
of said defendants, upon the following grounds
and for the following reasons:

IE

That count 2 of the indictment does not state
facts sufficient to constitute a crime.

IT.

That the Court erred in refusing to direct a

United States of America jl

verdict of not guilty, as to each of the said de-
fendants, at the close of the government’s evi-
dence.

HL

That the Court erred in refusing to direct a
verdict of not guilty as to each of said defend-
ants, at the close of all the evidence.

IV.

That the evidence was insufficient to justify
a verdict of guilty against George E. Knowlton
on count 2 of the indictment.

VI.

That the evidence was insufficient to justify

a verdict of guilty against Jerry Knowlton on
count 2 of the indictment.

Vil.

That the verdict of the jury against George
E. Knowlton was against the law as laid down
by the Court.

IX.

That the verdict of the jury against Jerry
Knowlton was against the law as laid down by
the Court.”

o2 George E. Knowlton, et al, vs.
Assignment VII.

That the Court erred in over-ruling the motion
of the said defendants, George E. Knowlton and
Jerry Knowlton, and each of them, for an order ar-
resting judgment, which said motion was as fol-
lows:

“And now after verdict against the defend-
ants, George E. Knowlton and Jerry Knowlton,
and before sentence, come the said defendants,
and each of them for themselves, by their at-
torneys, Manning & Beckman, and move the
Court here to arrest judgment herein and not
pronounce judgment against the said defend-
ants, or either of them, for the following rea-
sons:

le

That count 2 of the indictment does not state
facts sufficient to constitute a crime.

Il.

That the Court erred in refusing to direct a
verdict of not guilty, as to each of the said de-
fendants, at the close of the government’s evi-
dence.

Il.

That the Court erred in refusing to direct a ver-

United States of America 30

dict of not guilty, as to each of the said defend-
ants, at the close of all of the evidence.

IV.

That the evidence was insufficient to justify
a verdict of guilty against George E. Knowlton
on count 2 of the indictment.

VI.

That the evidence was insufficient to justify
a verdict of guilty against Jerry Knowlton on
count 2 of the indictment.

VIL.

That the verdict of the jury against George
kx. Knowlton was against the law as laid down
by the Court.

IX.

That the verdict of the jury against Jerry
Knowlton was against the law as laid down by
the Court.”

Assignment VIII.

That the Court erred in entering a judgment of
conviction and sentencing each of the said defend-
ants to confinement in the County Jail of Multno-
mah County, Oregon, for a period of six months.

34 George E. Knowlton, et al, vs.

WHEREFORE, on account of the errors above
assigned, the said judgment against each of the
said defendants ought to have been given for the
said defendants, and each of them, and against the
United States of America, now the said defendants,
and each of them, pray that the judgment of the
said Court be reversed and the sentence herein im-
posed upon the said defendants, and each of them,
be set aside, and that this cause be remanded to
the said District Court and such directions be given
that the above errors may be corrected and law and
justice done in the matter.

Dated this 19th day of April, 1920.
MANNING & BECKMAN,
Attorneys for Defendants.

Service acknowledged April 19th, 1920.
HALL 8. LUSK,
Assistant United States Attorney.

[Endorsed]: United States District Court, Dis-
trict of Oregon. Filed April 19, 1920. G. H. Marsh,

Clerk.

United States of America 30

In the District Court of the United States for the
District of Oregon.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff,
VS.
GEORGE E. KNOWLTON and
JERRY KNOWLTON,
Defendants.

Order Allowing Writ of Error.

Now, at this day, come the defendants in the
above entitled cause by Manning & Beckman, their
counsel, and present to the Court their petition
praying for the allowance of a Writ of Error to be
issued out of the United States Circuit Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit to review the judg-
ment of this Court entered in said cause, and move
the Court for an order allowing the said petition:

On consideration whereof, IT IS ORDERED
that the Writ of Error issue as prayed for in said
petition.

It is further ORDERED that all proceedings in
the above entitled District Court be stayed, super-
seded and suspended until the final disposition of
the Writ of Error in the aforesaid United States
Circuit Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit,
upon each defendant filing an undertaking in the
sum of Fifteen Hundred ($1,500.00) Dollars to be
approved by the Court.

36 George E. Knowlton, et al, vs.

Dated at Portland, Oregon, this 19th day of
April, 1920.
R. 8. BEAN, Judge.
[Endorsed]: United States District Court, Dis-
trict of Oregon. Filed April 19, 1920. G. H. Marsh,
Clerk.

In the District Court of the United States for the
District of Oregon.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff,
VS.
GEORGE E. KNOWLTON and
JERRY KNOWLTON,
Defendants.

Bond of Defendant, George E. Knowlton, on Writ
of Error.

KNOW ALL MEN BY THESE PRESENTS,
That we, George E. Knowlton, as principal, and
John Rometsch and Alfred A. Closset, as sureties,
are held and firmly bound unto the United States
of America in the penal sum of One Thousand Five
Hundred ($1,500.00) Dollars, for the payment of
which, well and truly to be made, we bind ourselves
and each of us, our heirs, executors, administrators,
suecessors and assigns, forever firmly by these
presents.

United States of America on

Sealed with our seals and dated and signed this
9th day of April, 1920.

WHEREAS, at the November term, 1919, of the
District Court of the United States for the District
of Oregon, in a cause therein pending, wherein the
United States was plaintiff and the said George E.
Knowlton was defendant, a judgment was rendered
against the said defendant on the 10th day of De-
cember, 1919, wherein and whereby the said defend-
ant was sentenced to be imprisoned in the County
Jail of Multnomah County at Portland, Oregon, for
the period of six months, and the said defendant
has prayed for and obtained a Writ of Error from
the United States Circuit Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit to review the said judgment and sen-
tence in the aforesaid action, and the citation di-
recting the United States to be and appear in the
said United States Circuit Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit at San Francisco, California, thirty
days from and after the date of said citation has
issued, which citation has been duly served.

NOW, THE CONDITION OF THIS OBLIGA-
TION IS SUCH, That if the said George E. Knowl-
ton shall appear either in person or by attorney in
the said Circuit Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit on such day or days as may be appointed
for the hearing of said cause in said Court, and
prosecute his writ of error and abide by the orders
made by the said United States Circuit Court of
Appeals, and shall surrender himself in execution

38 George E. Knowlton, et al, vs.

as said Court may direct, if the judgment and sen-
tence against him shall be affirmed, then this obli-
gation shall be void, otherwise to be and remain in
full force and effect.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, we have hereunto
set our hands and seals this 9th day of April, 1920.

JERRY KNOWLTON, (Seal)
Principal.

JOHN ROMETSCH, (Seal)
Surety.

ALFRED A. CLOSSET, (Seal)
Surety.

United States of America,
District of Oregon,—ss.

We, John Rometsch, residing at 300 Benton
Street, Portland, Oregon, each being first duly
sworn, for himself says: That I am a resident and
freeholder in the State of Oregon, and that I am
worth the sum of One Thousand Five Hundred
($1,500.00) Dollars over and above all my just debts
and liabilities, and exclusive of property exempt
from execution.

JOHN ROMETSCH.

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 9th day
of April, 1920.

G. H. MARSH,
Clerk United States District Court, District of
Oregon.

United States of America 39

United States of America,
District of Oregon,—ss.

I, Alfred A. Closset, residing at 514 Hancock
Street, Portland, Oregon, being duly sworn, depose
and say that I am one of the sureties in the fore-
going bond, that I am a resident and freeholder
within said District, and that I am worth, in prop-
erty situated therein, the sum of Fifteen Hundred
($1,500.00) Dollars, over and above all my just debts
and liabilities, exclusive of property exempt from
execution.

ALFRED A. CLOSSET.

Subscribed and sworn to before me this April
14th, 1920.
G. H. MARSH,
Clerk United States District Court, District
of Oregon.

The above bond approved April 19, 1920.
R. S. BEAN,
U.S. District Judge.
[Endorsed]: Filed April 19, 1920. G. H. Marsh,
Clerk.

40 George E. Knowlton, et al, vs.

In the District Court of the United States for the
District of Oregon.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff,
VS.
GEORGE E. KNOWLTON and
JERRY KNOWLTON,
Defendants.

Bond of Defendant, Jerry Knowlton, on Writ of
Error.

KNOW ALL MEN BY THESE PRESENTS,
That we, Jerry Knowlton, as principal, and John
Rometsch and A. A. Clossett, as sureties, are held
and firmly bound unto the United States of Amer-
ica In the penal sum of One Thousand Five Hundred
($1,500) Dollars, for the payment of which, well and
truly to be made, we bind ourselves and each of us,
our heirs, executors, administrators, successors and
assigns, forever firmly by these presents.

Sealed with our seals and dated and signed this
9th day of April, 1920.

WHEREAS, at the November term, 1919, of the
District Court of the United States for the District
of Oregon, in a cause therein pending, wherein the
United States was plaintiff and the said Jerry
Knowlton was defendant, a judgment was rendered
against the said defendant on the 10th day of De-
cember, 1919, wherein and whereby the said de-

United Slates of America A]

fendant was sentenced to be imprisoned in the
County Jail of Multnomah County at Portland, Ore-
gon, for the period of six months, and the said de-
fendant has prayed for and obtained a Writ of Er-
ror from the United States Circuit Court of Ap-
peals for the Ninth Circuit to review the said judg-
ment and sentence in the aforesaid action, and the
citation directing the United States to be and ap-
pear in the said United States Circuit Court of Ap-
peals for the Ninth Circuit at San Francisco, Cali-
fornia, thirty days from and after the date of said
citation has issued, which citation has been duly
served.

NOW, THE CONDITION OF THIS OBLIGA-
TION IS SUCH, That if the said Jerry Knowlton
shall appear either in person or by attorney in the
said Circuit Court of Appeals for the Ninth Cir-
cuit on such day or days as may be appointed for
the hearing of said cause in said Court, and prose-
cute his writ of error and abide by the orders made
by the said United States Circuit Court of Appeals,
and shall surrender himself in execution as said
Court may direct, if the judgment and sentence
against him shall be affirmed, then this obligation
shall be void, otherwise to be and remain in full
force and effect.

42 George E. Knowlton, et al, vs.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, we have hereunto
set our hands and seals this —— day of April, 1920.

JERRY KNOWLTON (Seal).
Principal.

JOHN ROMETSCH (Seal).
Surety.

ALFRED A. CLOSSET (Seal).
Surety.

United States of America,
District of Oregon,—ss.

We, John Rometsch, residing at 300 Benton St.,
Portland, Oregon, first duly sworn for himself
says: That I am a resident and freeholder in the
State of Oregon, and that I am worth the sum of
One Thousand Five Hundred ($1,500.00) Dollars
over and above all my just debts and liabilities, and

exclusive of property exempt from execution.
JOHN ROMETSCH.

Subseribed and sworn to before me this 9th

day of April, 1920.
G. H. MARSH,

Clerk United States District Court, District
of Oregon.

United States of America,
District of Oregon,—ss.

I, Alfred A. Closset, residing at 514 Hancock
Street, Portland, Oregon, being duly sworn, depose

United States of America A3

and say that I am one of the sureties in the fore-
going bond, that I am a resident and freeholder
within said District, and that I am worth, in prop-
erty situated therein, the sum of Fifteen Hundred —
($1,500.00) Dollars, over and above all my just debts
and liabilities, exclusive of property exempt from
execution.
ALFRED A. CLOSSET,
Subscribed and sworn to before me this 14th day
of April, 1920.
G. H. MARSH,
Clerk United States District Court, District of
Oregon.
The above bond approved April 19, 1920.
R. S. BEAN,
U.S. District Judge.
[Endorsed]: Filed April 19, 1920. G. H. Marsh,
Clerk.

In the District Court of the United States for the
District of Oregon.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff,
VS.
GEO. E. KNOWLTON and
JERRY KNOWLTON,
Defendants.

BILL OF EXCEPTIONS.

BE IT REMEMBERED, that on the 24th day of

44 George E. Knowlton, et al, vs.

November, 1919, at a stated term of said Court, be-
ginning and held in Portland, Oregon, before the
Hon. Robert 8. Bean, District Judge, presiding, the
above entitled cause came on to be heard before
said Court and the jury impaneled therein. The
United States appearing by Mr. B. H. Goldstein,
Assistant United States Attorney for said District;
and the defendants appearing in person, and repre-
sented by their counsel, Mr. John Manning and Mr.
John J. Beckman. Florence Knowlton, wife of de-
fendant Geo. E. Knowlton, was also a defendant.

WHEREUPON the following proceedings were
had:

T. M. Word, a witness on behalf of the Govern-
ment, after being duly sworn, testified as follows:
That he was a special agent of the Department of
Justice and had been since November 1, 1918. In
June, 1919, he was at Lakeview, Oregon, and on the
10th of said month left the said city at four o’clock
A. M. in company with the sheriff of Lake County,
Mr. Woodcock and wife, a 13-year-old boy and a
prisoner. They were in an automobile and were
going to Bend and Portland. On the road to Bend,
about 20 to 23 miles north of Lakeview, the witness
saw two automobiles on the right hand side of the
road, and he asked the sheriff to stop so he could
examine the machines and ascertain if there were
any “booze” in them; he looked the machines over
and took the names of same; one had a California
license and one an Oregon license; one of the cars

United States of America 45

was of the Stutz make and the other was a Mercer.
George Knowlton and his wife, Florence, were
asleep in the front seat of the Stutz car, and de-
fendant Jerry Knowlton was in the back part of the
Mercer. The witness then testified: “I woke up
the people in the Stutz car and asked them how
much liquor they had’. and he said he only had a
small amount for his own use, and I said how much,
and I think they said about 15 or 20 cases, and then
I awoke them; I got them out of the machine and
got the man out of the other machine. The one in
the Stutz car gave his name as Geo. W. Wilson, the
one in the Mercer car gave me the name of James
King. Then I looked in and under the mattress and
I saw that both of them was loaded with liquor, and
the sheriff got out and came over with me at the
time I took the number of the machines, and then
I told them that I was a special agent for the gov-
ernment, and told them who I was, and they knew
of me; they had lived here.”

The witness then testified that he took Mrs. Wil-
son out of the Stutz car and put her into the car
with the sheriff’s wife, his son and the prisoner,
and put the sheriff into the Stutz car and started
on toward Bend. In the Mercer car there was a
wide mattress over the top and some blankets over
that and a box of food and clothing, and the other
car had some blankets over it, and some gunny
sacks. The place where the defendants were found
was about 35 miles from the California State line

46 George E. Knowlton, et al, vs.

in the State of Oregon. When the several machines
above mentioned got near Paisley they all stopped
and Mrs. Wilson got out of the sheriffs’ car in
which she was riding, saying that she felt sick. She
then got into the Stutz car with her husband and
the sheriff; afterward the car stopped and George
Knowlton and the sheriff got out, and then Mrs.
Knowlton started to run away with the machine.
We pursued her in Jerry’s car, Jerry driving, for
some distance, about five or six miles, when we
caught up with her. Then they all went back to the
main road and Jerry Knowlton took out a box of
provisions from his machine and made some coffee,
and I ate a beef heart sandwich; the provisions
were in a wooden box; “there were quite a lot of
sandwiches, and there was some kind of stuff in it.
I don’t remember.”

Q. Did you notice what kind of liquor they had
there?

A. Yes, they had some Sunnybrook, some
brandy and some old Sage pints and quarts.

“We then proceeded to Bend; we left there about
a quarter to eight, and the sheriff left me there and
came with his prisoner and family to Portland. The
sheriff at Bend came to the hotel and we took the
liquor to the jail, unloaded and counted it; there
were 234 bottles in the Stutz car and 201, I think, in
the Mercer; I am not sure. Some of the bottles was
whiskey, and a few bottles of brandy and a few
bottles of gin. The bottles had revenue stamps on

United States of America 47

them. We unloaded the Stutz liquor in one cell
and the Mercer in another cell and turned it over
to the sheriff for the night and put the men in jail.
We left Bend at 2:20 the next day and went to The
Dalles. I took George Knowlton with me and Jerry
Knowlton went with another person.”

The witness then testified that upon arriving at
The Dalles he took George Knowlton in a restaurant
with him, and left the Stutz car containing the
liquor in front of the restaurant, where he could
watch same. While in the restaurant a man got
into the machine and witness ran out of the res-
taurant and fired several shots and hit a building.
The car was later recovered about 26 miles from
The Dalles near Dufur; the booze had been taken
out and the car left stranded. The Mercer car came
from Bend by another road and got as far as the
Deschutes river; then witness went up with the
Stutz car and loaded the stuff out of the Mercer
car and brought it to The Dalles.

ON CROSS EXAMINATION the witness testi-
fied that at the time Mrs. Knowlton got out of the
sheriff’s car, as stated in his direct examination,
she complained that the Ford, the sheriff’s car, was
hard riding and that she was not feeling well. The
prisoner in the Ford car riding with her was a wife
murderer and was being taken to the state peniten-
tiary to serve a sentence upon conviction for that
crime. Several bottles were offered in evidence
containing liquor, and the witness stated that this

48 George E. Knowlton, et al, vs.

came from the Mercer car. No bottles out of the
Stutz car were produced in evidence, nor were any
of them in possession of witness.

Q. Then you don’t know whether he, George
Knowlton, had whiskey, brandy, gin, or any thing
in his car, except you know he had bottles?

A. I know he had whiskey and gin.

. Did you see, as a matter of fact, any of it?

No; I never touched it.

Q

A

@. How do you know he had whiskey?

A. I can tell a bottle of whiskey when I see it.
Q. I know you can tell a bottle from the label

on the bottle, but is that proof to you; would you
swear to it that it was whiskey?

A. I can swear that he begged me all night to
let him open a bottle and let him take a drink.

Q. That is all right, but I am asking you if you
can swear positively that he had whiskey in that
bottle? A. I just told you.

Q. You didn’t taste it?

A. No, I never tasted it.

Q. And he might have had a bottle of hquor?

A. He begged me to take a drink with him, but
I would not do it.

United States of America AQ
Q. Did he havea bottle open? A. Yes.

Q. Did he take a drink?

A. I don’t remember; I don’t think he took a
drink that night.

Witness further testified that he had never seen
the defendants in the State of Califorina.

Q. Then you don’t know from whom they
bought this liquor, do you?

A. No, they did not tell; they told, like all the
rest of them, that they bought it in Oregon.

The witness further testified that he did not
have a bottle of any description from the Stutz car;
that the defendants had a fishing basket and some
fishing tackle with them.

E. E. WOODCOCK, called as witness on behalf
of the Government, and being sworn, testified as
follows:

That he was the sheriff of Lake County, Oregon ;
that on June 10, 1919, he accompanied special agent,
Tom Word, from Lakeview to Bend; that he was
on his way to Salem with a prisoner; that he was
accompanied by his wife and son, the said prisoner
and Tom Word; they were all riding in a Ford; they
left Lakeview at four A. M. and about 25 miles
north of Lakeview they saw two big machines by
the side of the road; that they thereupon stopped

a0 George E. Knowlton, et al, vs.

and Word and he jumped out of the Ford; he .
stepped to one machine and Word to the other; the
side curtains were all down and the occupants were
asleep; they woke them up and asked them what
they were loaded with, and they said they had a
little booze for their own use; the machines were
heavily loaded with booze; the occupants of the car
were George Knowlton and his wife in one car, and
Jerry Knowlton in the other car. We placed them
under arrest and decided to bring them to Portland.
The prisoner who was being taken to the peniten-
tiary, was put into the Ford car with witness’s wife
and boy and Mrs. Knowlton. The witness got into
one of defendants’ cars and Tom Word into the
other. The witness stated that he tasted some
whiskey from a bottle which was in the Stutz car.

ON CROSS EXAMINATION the witness said
that the prisoner having been convicted of murder,
he was taking him to the penitentiary. At the time
he stopped to look at the cars belonging to defend-
ants, he and Special Agent Word were looking for
certain other automobiles, but not these. Both
George Knowlton and Jerry Knowlton told the wit-
ness and Tom Word that they bought the liquor
which was in their cars from some one in Oregon
a short while before; they said there was no Fed-
eral charge against them as they got the liquor in
Oregon. As far as the witness knew, they might
have got it in Oregon.

ON RE-DIRECT EXAMINATION, the witness

United States of America ol

testified that the road where the defendants were
found was the main traveled road from Lakeview
to Bend. Lakeview is 15 miles from the nearest
California point; the nearest California town to
Lakeview is Fairport; the nearest large California
town on the road to Lakeview is Alturas, which is
about 45 miles from the boundary line of Oregon.

ON RE-CROSS EXAMINATION, the witness
testified that there were no other roads running
into the road where the defendants were found
north of Lakeview, except roads leading from
ranches. There are two roads leading from Lake-
view to Paisley, Oregon, and there are also roads
from Klamath Falls, Oregon, to Lakeview and from
Silver Lake, Oregon, to Lakeview.

H. W. LAUGENOUR, a witness called on behalf
of the government, being first duly sworn, testified
as follows:

That in the month of June, 1919, he was at Davis
Creek, California; this town is about 25 miles north
of Alturas and about 12 or 15 miles south of the
Oregon State line; the witness further testified that
on June 9, 1919, two men and a woman came into his
store at Davis Creek; he identified Jerry Knowlton
as being one of the men, and a spectator among the
audience in the court room (and not one of the de-
fendants) as the other man, and was not able to
identify the woman; the woman had on a khaki uni-
form when he saw her in the store and wore leather

52 George E. Knowlton, et al, vs.

leggings; the taller of the men, whom the witness
identified as Jerry Knowlton, came to the counter
and purchased some sardines, sausages, cheese and
oranges; afterward he saw two machines through
the window of his store, one of which he described
as a Stutz and the other as a Mercer. The witness
was in the automobile business from 1903 to 1912.

Q. When was it this took place?

A. Some time near lunch; I don’t know exactly.

ON CROSS EXAMINATION, the witness testi-
fied that these people were strangers to him; that
he had never seen them before; that the govern-
ment special agent called upon him and showed him
photographs of the defendants; witness stated that
he was unable to identify the wife of George Knowl-
ton (who was one of the defendants being tried),
as the woman he saw in the store. When the wit-
ness went to the window to look at the automobile,
some one having called his attention to them, they
were from 75 to 100 feet away on a side street,
one on each side; they were not on the street in
front of his store. The front ends of the cars were
not facing him, and he got a side view of them.

EUGENE B. ASH, called as a witness on behalf
of the Government, and being sworn, testified as
follows:

June 9, 1919, as near as he could recall, he was in
the garage business in that town; that on said date,

United States of America 53

That he lived at Alturas, California; that on
between 1 and 2 o’clock in the afternoon, a Mercer
car drove into his garage with defendant, Jerry
Knowlton, therein; he wanted to know if witness
could fix the car, and witness found a broken frame
on it, which he repaired. The witness knew that
the car was heavily loaded because it broke through
the floor at one place; the car was fixed about 10
P. M. of the same day. After the car was finished
Jerry Knowlton took out a “partly drank” bottle of
brandy, and the witness, his father and Jerry
Knowlton finished up the bottle of brandy and the
bottle was left in the shop. As near as witness
could recollect Knowlton went around to the right
hand side of the car and reached in and pulled the
bottle out; the witness never paid particular atten-
tion to how he got the bottle. The back of the car
seemed to be pretty well filled up, but it was cov-
ered over and witness did not know what was in-
side. The witness identified the bottle which he
said he thought was the same one which had been
left in the shop from which they had partaken, as
aforesaid. Next day the witness’ brother threw the
bottle outside, and when Special Agent Word came
he looked about for it and found it; the label on the
bottle was Three Star Claremont Brandy. Defend-
ant Jerry Knowlton was at the garage most of the
time while the car was being repaired.

ON CROSS EXAMINATION, the witness testi-
fied that it was not against the law to have liquor
in California at that time; that the brother of wit-

54 George E. Knowlton, et al, vs.

ness threw the bottle from which they all partook
outside the shop in a corner between two buildings
and that was the way he came to find it afterwar¢
when the agent wanted to know if he could find it;
that this was some time afterward. Witness never
had the bottle in his possession from the time it was
thrown out of the shop, as above stated, until Mr.
Word came and interviewed him, when it was
turned over to Mr. Word. Witness could not iden-
tify the bottle as being the identical one, but that it
was just like the one from which they drank.

On further cross examination, witness testified
that the Mercer car would weigh about 4200 or 4300
pounds; that the garage had a wooden floor which
was old; and that before this time a two-ton truck
had also broken through the floor. The building
was about 10 or 15 years old and the floor was the
same age as the building.

T. M. WORD, again called as witness by the Gov-
ernment, testified that he had procured the bottle
from the witness Ash, and that it was the same one
concerning which testimony had been given by Mr.
Ash, whereupon the same was offered and received
in evidence. Mr. Word called upon Mr. Ash and ob-
tained the bottle about two months after the arrest
of the defendants; the witness said that Mr. Ash
had said that his brother had put the bottle outside,
and that Ash then went outside accompanied by the
witness and picked up the bottle off the ground at
a place between two buildings.

United States of America YD)

F. L. KESER, a witness called on behalf of the
Government, being sworn, testified as follows:

That on June 9, 1919, he was in business at Al-
turas, California, the name of his business being the
Alturas Tire & Battery Co.; that on said date he
recalled a Stutz car being there; that a man and
woman were in same and the woman was dressed
in a khaki suit. He saw the Stutz car between ten
and eleven o’clock on the morning of that date; he
repaired a tire and furnished gasoline for the peo-
ple in the Stutz car. The back of the car was piled
up level with the back seat and covered over with a
blanket or canvas. The witness was unable to iden-
tify any of the defendants as being the persons who
were in the Stutz car at that time.

ON CROSS EXAMINATION, the witness testi-
fied that it was not an unusual thing to see a car
covered up and full of valises, bedding, etc., when
driven by tourists. The witness did not recognize
the defendant George Knowlton or his wife, or de-
fendant, Jerry Knowlton, as being any of the par-
ties who were in or were driving the Stutz car. He
expressly stated that Mrs. Florence Knowlton was
not the woman that he had reference to. The wit-
ness distinctly remembered the Stutz ear by the way
it was painted. It had white wire wheels and was
of a kind of maroon color with gold stripes and the
lights were painted white. Witness was not abso-
lutely sure the color was maroon, but knew the same
was red.

56 George E. Knowlton, et al, vs.

HENRY KOCK, called as witness on behalf of
the Government, being sworn, testified as follows:

That he lived in Alturas, California, and in June
1919, was running a lunch counter there; that on
the 8th or 9th of June two men came to his lun:
counter and purchased 20 sandwiches — ten beef
heart and ten pork sandwiches; the sandwiches
were placed in a small spaghetti box. Witness rec-
ognized Jerry Knowlton as being one of the men
who purchased the sandwiches, but could not state
as to who the other man was. The witness thought
that Jerry Knowlton came in a machine because he
heard fellows make the remark about two nice big
machines. He did not see the machines nor who
occupied them.

ON CROSS EXAMINATION, witness stated
that the sale of sandwiches was for cash. He stated
that Jerry Knowlton was not pointed out to him,
but he was shown Jerry’s picture by Mr. Word in
California, and also since he came to Portland to
testify as a witness. The witness was also unable
to recognize George Knowlton as being present at
the time said sandwiches were sold. Witness was
busy waiting on other customers at time of sale and
it probably took him half an hour before the sand-
wiches were put up and delivered, at the time his
attention was divided between different customers.
Witness further testified that Mr. Word came to
California and showed him a picture and said, Did
you ever see this man in here? And I said, I think

United States of America 57

I have; and he said look again, and I looked again
and said, I am very sure this is the man I sold sand-
wiches to.

Q. Never saw the man in your life before?

A. No sir; but when I see a man’s picture I can
pretty near recognize him.

Q. You never thought of this man from the
time he bought the sandwiches and went out, until
Mr. Word came in and asked you if you recognized
the picture?

A. No, sir; the sandwiches were purchased he-
tween eleven and one o’clock in the day time and
on the 8th or 9th of the month.

Witness kept no track of the number of sand-
wiches sold, except an item in his account book that
there were 20 sandwiches sold on the 8th and 9th
of June, without itemizing the particular kind.

The Government then rested.

Exception I.

WHEREUPON the defendants, in due and
proper season, by their counsel, then moved the
Court for an instructed verdict as follows:

“T also move the Court to instruct the jury to

bring in a verdict of acquittal as to Count 2, the
violation of the Reed Amendment. First, for the

58 George E. Knowlton, et al, vs.

reason that there has been no proof that these de-
fendants, or any of them, ordered, purchased, or
caused to be transported in interstate commerce
any intoxicating liquor from California into Ore-
gon; nor has there been any proof of the purpose
for which the intoxicating liquor was to be used;
and I might also say there is a variance between the
indictment and the proof. The indictment says they
ordered, purchased and caused to be transported in
interstate commerce from the State of California
to Portland, in the State and District of Oregon.
The Grand Jury having alleged definitely that they
were transporting this to Portland, I think they are
confined to that allegation. There has been no proof
whatsoever that these liquors, if there were any at
all, were to be transported to Portland, or any
where near Portland, or that these people had ever
been in Portland.

COURT: I don’t think it necessary to take up
any more time on that. In my judgment there is
sufficient evidence in this case to call upon the jury
to determine these disputed questions raised by the
plea of not guilty, and under these circumstances it
would not be proper or just for the Court to com-
ment upon the testimony in any shape or form. The
motion, therefore, will be overruled without any
further comment.

MR. BECKMAN: Exception, if Your Honor
please.

United States of America ae
COURT: Certainly.

The defendant then called T. M. WORD as a
witness, he having been previously sworn, and he
testified as follows.

That on the 10th day of June, 1919, when he ar-
rested the defendant he took charge of the Stutz
ear and brought the same to Portland, put it in
Therklesen’s garage, where it had been ever since
and was at the time of trial; that it had been in the
Government’s possession ever since the said arrest,
and nothing had been done to it, either by himself
or on behalf of the Government, in the way of
painting, or otherwise, since the arrest.

L. E. THERKELSEN, being called as witness by
defendants, being sworn, testified as follows:

That he was in the automobile business in Port-
land and that Mr. Word had placed in his possession
a Stutz car owned by defendant George Knowlton,
with instructions to keep the same until he heard
from Mr. Word; and that ever since the same had
been in his possession there had been nothing done
to it in the way of painting; that the color of the
wheels of the car was black and the body red; that
there were no gold stripes, or any other stripes.
The fenders were black and the body painted red.

Thereupon the defendants rested.
Exception II.

Whereupon the following proceedings were had;

60 George E. Knowlton, et al, vs.

the defendants, in due and proper season by their
counsel, made the following motion:

MR. BECKMAN: I desire at this time to renew
my motion for a directed verdict as to each count
in the indictment on the same ground and for the
same reasons that I stated in my motion at the close
of the Government’s case, with the understanding
that this motion at this time covers all the objec-
tions made at that time.

WHEREUPON the Court over ruled said mo-
tion, and the defendants requested and were al-
lowed an exception.

Exception III.

WHEREUPON the defendants in proper time
and season requested the Court to instruct the jury
as follows:

Circumstantial evidence is the evidence of cer-
tain facts from which are to be inferred the exist-
ence of other material facts bearing upon the ques-
tion at issue or facts to be proved. This evidence is
legal and competent, and, when of such a character
as to exclude every reasonable doubt of defendants’
innocence, is entitled to as much weight as direct
evidence. When a conviction is sought on circum-
stantial evidence alone, it must not only be shown
by preponderance of evidence that the facts are
true, but they must be such as are absolutely op-

United States of America 61

posed, upon any reasonable ground of reasoning
with the innocence of the accused, and incapable of
explanation upon any reasonable hypothesis other
than that of the guilt of the accused. The degree
of certainty must be equal to that of direct testi-
mony and, if there is any single fact proved to your
satisfaction by a preponderance of evidence which
is inconsistent with defendants’ guilt, this is suffi-
cient to raise a reasonable doubt, and the jury
should acquit the defendant. In order to justify the
inference of legal guilt from circumstantial evi-
dence, the proof must be absolutely incompatible
with the innocence of the accused, and incapable of
explanation upon any other reasonable hypothesis
than that of his guilt. If there is any reasonable
doubt as to reality of the connection of the circum-
stances of evidence with the facts to be proved, or
as to the completeness of the proof, or as to the
proper conclusion to be drawn from the evidence,
it is safer to err in acquitting than in convicting.

WHEREUPON the Court declined, neglected
and refused to instruct the jury as was requested,
and through the failure, neglect and refusal of the
Court to so instruct, the defendants, in due and
proper time and manner, requested, and were al-
lowed an exception as to said requested instruction.

WHEREUPON the Court instructed the jury as
follows:

“Gentlemen of the Jury:
A law of the United States provides that who-

62 George E. Knowlton, et al, vs.

ever shall order, purchase or cause intoxicating
liquors to be transported in interstate commerce,
except for scientific, sacramental or medicinal pur-
poses, into any state or territory, the laws of which
state or territory prohibit the manufacture or sale
therein of intoxicating liquors shall be punished as
provided in the statute. To come within the pro-
visions of this statute it is necessary that the trans-
portation of intoxicating liquors be from one state
into another state, the laws of which prohibit the
manufacture or sale. The laws of Oregon prohibit
the manufacture and sale of intoxicating liquors
and, therefore, it is a violation of this statute for
any person to transport from another state into
Oregon intoxicating liquors. Another statute of
the United States provides that if two or more per-
sons conspire either to commit an offense against
the United States or to defraud it In any manner
and one or more of such parties do any act to effect
the object of the conspiracy, each of the parties
shall be guilty of the crime and punished as pro-
vided in the statute.

The indictment in this case charges the three
defendants on trial, in the first count, with viola-
tion of Section 37, and in count two with the viola-
tion of the statute that I first read to you.

The first count in the indictment charges in sub-
stance that in January, or about January, 1919, the
three defendants entered into a conspiracy or un-
lawful agreement to transport into this state from

United States of America 63

the State of California intoxicating liquors, and
that in pursuance of such agreement and under-
standing, and in furtherance of such unlawful con-
spiracy, the two defendants, George Knollton and
Florence Knollton, drove a certain automobile de-
scribed in the indictment as a Stutz machine, which
contained a quantity of liquor, from a point in Cali-
fornia, the exact place thereof to the Grand Jury
unknown to Lakeview in the State of Oregon.
Again another act alleged to have been in further-
ance of this conspiracy was that upon the same date
the defendant, Jerry Knollton drove a certain auto-
mobile, described in the indictment as a Mercer ma-
chine, containing intoxicating liquors from the
State of California into Oregon. And, third, that
in pursuance of this alleged conspiracy the three de-
fendants had in their possession some twenty-five
miles from Lakeview a certain quantity of intoxi-
cating liquor.

The second count of the indictment charges the
three defendants with wilfully and unlawfully
transporting or causing to be transported from the
State of California into Oregon a quantity of in-
toxicating liquors described in the indictment as
435 quarts.

The defendants have each entered a plea of not
guilty, and that plea controverts and is a denial of
every material allegation in the indictment, and im-
poses upon the government the duty of proving such
allegations to your satisfaction beyond a reasonable

64 George E. Knowlton, et al, vs.

doubt before you will be justified in finding the
defendants, or either of them, guilty. The defend-
ants in this case, as in all criminal cases, come be-
fore this jury clothed with the presumption of in-
nocence, and the presumption continues with them
throughout the trial until it is overcome by the tes-
timony. In other words, it is not incumbent upon
a defendant charged with a criminal offense to
prove his or her innocence, but it is the duty of the
Government, or the state as the case may be, to
prove the guilt, and that beyond a reasonable doubt.

By a reasonable doubt, I do not mean a mere
possible doubt; I do not mean a doubt such as a
juror can conjure up in his own mind without any
basis for it, but I mean a real substantial doubt,
based whether upon the testimony or the want of
testimony, and being such a doubt as would cause a
reasonably prudent man to hesitate to act in his
own most important affairs. And, if, after you
have considered all of the evidence in this case, you
entertain such a doubt, the defendants are entitled
to the benefit of it and an acquittal.

Proof sufficient to justify a conviction in a crim-
inal cases must be of a clear and convincing char-
acter. It is not sufficient to base a verdict upon
mere conjecture, speculation or inference, not justi-
fied by the proof in the case, but it must be upon
real substantial testimony that satisfies the minds
of the jurors of the guilt of the defendants beyond
a reasonable doubt.

United States of America 65

As I have said, the first count in the indictment
charges the defendants with the crime of con-
spiracy. A conspiracy is a mere unlawful agree-
ment or understanding between two or more per-
sons to commit an offense against the United
States, and in this particular instance to commit
the offense charged, which is alleged to have been
the transportation of liquor from California into
Oregon. Direct and positive proof of a conspiracy
is not required. It may be shown by circumstances,
by association, by co-operation, but there must be a
unity of action and in pursuance of some plan or
scheme entered into between the parties, and in this
case, unless you believe there has been such an un-
derstanding or agreement between these parties,
then the charge of conspiracy is not made out.

Conspiracy alone does not constitute a crime,
but it is necessary in order to complete the offense
that one or more of the conspirators do some act to
effect the object thereof or in furtherance of the
conspiracy as charged in this indictment, as I have
already called to your attention, and if you believe
from the evidence, beyond a reasonable doubt that
these people entered into, either positively or im-
pliedly, an understanding or agreement that they
should transport intoxicating liquors from Cali-
fornia into Oregon, and that in pursuance of that
agreement and in furtherance thereof one of them
drove an automobile containing liquor across the
line, that would constitute an overt act within the

66 George E. Knowlton, et al, vs.

statute and complete the offense; and the same may
be said as to either of the other two overt acts. It is
not necessary for the Government to prove all three
of them, but any one of them would satisfy that
requirement of the statute.

The next count in the indictment is a direct
charge that these parties transported intoxicating
liquors from California into the State of Oregon,
and that is a straight charge which has been denied
by the plea of not guilty, and is for you to deter-
mine from the testimony.

Now, Gentlemen, the questions involved in this
case under the rules as I have and shall give them
to you are questions of fact, and all questions of
fact are to be determined by this jury.

The Court over ruled a motion for a directed
verdict, in your presence. You are not to infer
from that, that in the opinion of the Court there is
sufficient evidence to justify a conviction in this
case. Under the system of administration of the
law prevailing in this country it is the duty of the
Court to determine all questions of law, and the ex-
clusive duty of the jury to determine all questions
of fact, and all that was implied or can be implied
from the action of the Court in over-ruling the mo-
tion for a directed verdict is that in its judgment
there was at least some evidence to go to the jury
upon the questions involved in this controversy,
and the Court has no more right to invade your

United States of America 67

province and undertake to determine a disputed
question of fact than you have a right to invade its
province and undertake to determine a question of
law. The duties of each are separate and distinct
and one has no right to assume to perform the
duties of the other. Therefore, no inference is to
be drawn by this jury as against the defendants
from the action of the Court in overruling the mo-
tion for a directed verdict.

You are the exclusive judges of all questions of
fact in the case and of the credibility of all wit-
nesses. Every witness is presumed to speak the
truth. The presumption, however, may be over-
come by the manner in which a witness testifies, by
his appearance upon the witness stand, by contra-
dictory testimony, or by evidence effecting his rep-
utation or standing. You have heard these wit-
nesses testify; you have noticed their appearance
upon the witness stand, and now it is for you, and
you alone, to determine what weight and credit is
to be given to the testimony, judging from their
appearance, their manner of testifying, their pow-
ers of observation, and all the circumstances sur-
rounding their testimony, and from that determine
what credit shall be given to it.

The Government relies to a considerable extent
on what is known as circumstantial evidence. This
character of evidence is competent and is often re-
sorted to in the trial of criminal cases. When a
conviction is sought upon it, it should not only show

68 George E. Knowlton, et al, vs.

that the circumstances testified to are true, but
that they are not capable of reconciliation or being
reconciled with the theory of the defendants’ inno-
cence. It is the duty of the jury in considering the
testimony in the case, if you care to reconcile it with
the theory of the defendants’ innocence. The de-
gree of certainty when circumstantial evidence if
relied upon must be equal to direct testimony, and
if there is any fact proved to your satisfaction by a
preponderance of the evidence which is inconsistent
with guilt, and that is a material fact in the chain
of circumstances, then that will be sufficient to
raise a reasonable doubt, and the defendant would
be entitled to the benefit of it.

It is in evidence that George Knollton and Flor-
ence Knollton, two of the defendants, are husband
and wife, and as far as the question of conspiracy
is concerned they are to be considered as one, so
that before you could find the defendants guilty on
the first count of the indictment, it will be necessary
for you to find there was co-operation, understand-
ing and agreement between the two Knollton broth-
ers.

The defendants have not testified in the case;
they were not obliged to, not required to, and no
inference is to be drawn against them because they
did not testify; they had a perfect right to refrain
from doing so, and to say to the Government, as the
law says they may, “You charged me with this
crime and it is your duty to prove it, and to prove

United States of America 69

it beyond a reasonable doubt,” and no unfavorable
inference or deduction is to be inferred or assumed
against the defendants because of their failure to
testify.

There are two counts in this indictment. It will
be necessary for this jury to pass upon each one,
and to find a verdict of either guilty or not guilty,
as you may think the testimony warrants.

You have no concern, of course, with the punish-
ment that may follow the verdict in case you should
find the defendants guilty. It is your duty under
the testimony and under your oaths to say whether
they are guilty or not, and if you believe they are,
beyond a reasonable doubt, then it is your duty to
say so, leaving the question of punishment, what-
ever it may be, to the Court. If, on the other hand,
you are not able to say beyond a reasonable doubt
that they are guilty, or if you have a reasonable
doubt upon that subject, you should give them the
benefit of it and acquit.

MR. BECKMAN: Talso want to call the Court’s
attention to the early part of the instructions re-
garding what is alleged in Count 1 of the indict-
ment. I believe the Court told the jury as to overt
acts 2 and 3, the indictment reads that defendant
George Knollton and Florence Knollton drove a car
to Oregon; I think the indictment limits it to Lake-
view, Oregon.

70 George E. Knowlton, et al, vs.

COURT: I make that correction; I notice it
Says they drove across the Oregon line to Lakeview.

MR. BECKMAN: As to Count 2 of the indict-
ment, the Court said that they bringing the whiskey
from California into Oregon. I think the indict-
ment says from California to Portland in the State
of Oregon.

COURT: It does say that.

MR. BECKMAN: They are required to prove
it as alleged.

COURT: It says from California to Portland in
the State of Oregon.

And the foregoing instructions are all the in-
structions given by the Court to the jury at said
trial.

Exception IV.

Thereafter, within the time allowed by the
Court, the defendants moved the Court as follows:,

“Comes now George W. Knowlton, Florence May
Knowlton and Jerry Knowlton, the above named
defendants, each for themselves, by their attorneys,
Manning & Beckman, within the time allowed by
Court, and move the Court for a new trial on be-
half of each of said defendants, upon the following
grounds and for the following reasons:

United States of America 71
I.

That count 2 of the indictment does not state
facts sufficient to constitute a crime.

IT.

That the Court erred in refusing to direct a ver-
dict of not guilty, as to each of the said defendants
at the close of the Government’s evidence.

Wig

That the Court erred in refusing to direct a
verdict of not guilty as to each of the said defend-
ants, at the close of all the evidence.

IV.

That the evidence was insufficient to justify a
verdict of guilty against George E. Knowlton on
count 2 of the indictment.

if

That the evidence was insufficient to justify a
verdict of guilty against Florence May Knowlton on
count 2 of the indictment.

VI.

That the evidence was insufficient to justify a
verdict of guilty against Jerry Knowlton on count
2 of the indictment.

72 George E. Knowlton, et al, vs.
VIL.

That the verdict of the jury against George
E. Knowlton was against the law as laid down by
the Court.

VIL.

That the verdict of the jury against Florence
May Knowlton was against the law as laid down by

the Court.
Xx.

That the verdict of the jury against Jerry
Knowlton was against the law as laid down by the

Court.

Thereafter the Court heard arguments of coun-
sel upon the said motion and sustained the same as
to defendant Florence May Knowlton, and over-
ruled the same as to the defendants George E.
Knowlton and Jerry Knowlton, to which action of
the Court, the two last named defendants were duly
allowed an exception. |

Exception V.

Thereafter, within the time allowed by the Court
the defendants moved the Court for an arrest of
judgment as follows:

AND now after verdict against the defendants

United States of America 713

George E. Knowlton and Florence May Knowlton
and Jerry Knowlton, and before sentence, come the
said defendants, and each of them for themselves,
by their attorneys, Manning & Beckman, and move
the Court here to arrest judgment herein and not
pronounce judgment against the said defendants,
or either of them, for the following reasons:

II.

That count 2 of the indictment does not state
facts sufficient to constitute a crime.

IT.

That the Court erred in refusing to direct a ver-
dict of not guilty, as to each of the said defendants,
at the close of the Government’s evidence.

ria

That the Court erred in refusing to direct a ver-
dict of not guilty, as to each of the said defendants,
at the close of all of the evidence.

IV.

That the evidence was insufficient to justify a
verdict of guilty against George E. Knowlton on
count 2 of the indictment.

V.

That evidence was insufficient to justify a ver-

74 George E. Knowlton, et al, vs.

dict of guilty against Florence May Knowlton on
count 2 of the indictment.

VI.

That the evidence was insufficient to justify a
verdict of guilty against Jerry Knowlton on count

- 2 of the indictment.

VIL.

That the verdict of the jury against George E.
Knowlton was against the law as laid down by the
Court.

ViUl.

That the verdict of the jury against Florence
May Knowlton was against the law as laid down by
the Court.

IX.

That the verdict of the jury against Jerry
Knowlton was against the law as laid down by the

Court.

Thereafter the Court heard the arguments of
counsel upon said motion, and allowed the said mo-
tion as to defendant Florence May Knowlton, and
over-ruled the said motion as to defendants George
E. Knowlton and Jerry Knowlton, to which action
of the Court the last two named defendants were

allowed an exception.

United States of America 79

Exception VI.

Thereafter, the Court entered a judgment of
conviction and sentenced the defendants, George E.
Knowlton and Jerry Knowlton, to confinement in
the County Jail of Multnomah County, Oregon for
a period of six months.

It is certified that the foregoing is all of the
testimony, evidence, records and exceptions in said
case material to the exceptions herein noted.

Thereafter, within the time allowed by the Court,
the defendants, George E. Knowlton and Jerry
Knowlton, presented this, their Bill of Exceptions,
which is hereby allowed.

Dated this 19th day of April, 1920.
R. 8S. BEAN,
District Judge.

Due service of the within Bill of Exceptions is
hereby accepted this 19th day of April, 1920.
JOHN C. VEATCH,
Assistant United States Attorney.

[Endorsed]: United States District Court, Dis-
trict of Oregon. Filed April 19, 1920. G. H. Marsh,
Clerk.

76 George E. Knowlton, et al, vs.

In the District Court of the United States for the
District of Oregon.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff,
VS.
GEORGE E. KNOWLTON and
JERRY KNOWLTON,
Defendants.

Sitpulation as to Record.

It is hereby stipulated by and between the United
States of America, by John C. Veatch, Assistant
United States Attorney for the District of Oregon,
and George E. Knowlton and Jerry Knowlton, the
defendants, by Manning & Beckman, their attor-
neys, that the following documents, papers and rec-
ords in the case of the United States of America vs.
George E. Knowlton and Jerry Knowlton shall be
included in the transcript of record in the said
cause, and that the same are all the necessary docu-
ments, papers and records to be considered in re-
viewing the said case on writ of error, to-wit:

Indictment.

Bill of Exceptions.

Assignments of Error.

Petition for Writ of Error.

Order Allowing Writ of Error.

Citation.

Writ of Error.

Arraignment and Plea.

United States of America 77

Impaneling of Jury.
Verdict.

Judgment.

Bond.

It is further hereby stipulated between the re-
spective parties hereto that the foregoing printed
record now tendered to the Clerk of the above en-
titled Court for his certificate, and filed in the
above cause, is a true transcript of the record in
said cause, and that the said Clerk may certify said
transcript to the United States Circuit Court of Ap-
peals for the Ninth Circuit, without comparing the
same with the original record which is on file
herein.

Dated this 17th day of May, 1920.
JOHN C. VEATCH,
Attorneys for Plaintiff.
MANNING & BECKMAN,
Attorneys for Defendants.

[Endorsed]: Filed May 17, 1920. G. H. Marsh,
Clerk.

718 George E. Knowlton, et al, vs.

In the District Court of the United States for the
District of Oregon.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff,
vs.
GEORGE E. KNOWLTON and
JERRY KNOWLTON,
Defendants.

Order Under Rule 16 Enlarging Time to June 15,
1920, to File Record Thereof and to Docket Case.

Now at this time, upon motion of defendants, by
their attorneys, Manning & Beckman, the time
within which the defendants are allowed to file
their transcript of record and docket said cause in
the United States Circuit Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit is hereby extended to and including
the 15th day of June, 1920.

Dated at Portland, Oregon, this 17th day of May,
1920.
R. S. BEAN, Judge.

United States of America ao

In the District Court of the Umted States for the
District of Oregon.

UNITE DSTATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff,
VS.
GEORGE E. KNOWLTON and
JERRY KNOWLTON,
Defendants.

United States of America,
District of Oregon,—ss.

I, G. H. Marsh, Clerk of the District Court of
the United States for the District of Oregon, do
hereby certify that the foregoing printed transcript
of record on writ of error in the case of George E.
Knowlton and Jerry Knowlton, plaintiffs in error,
vs. United States of America, defendant in error, is
a true transcript of the record in said cause in said
Court. This certificate is made without comparing
the said transcript of record with the original rec-
ord in said cause, pursuant to the stipulation of the
parties therein that this record may be certified to
by me to be a true copy, without comparison.

IN TESTIMONY WHEREOF, I have hereunto
set my hand and the seal of said Court in said Dis-
trict this —— day of May, 1920.